Railway Safety Performance in the European Union



European Railway Agency











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2010



Foreword

This is the third report that the Agency has published on the development of railway safety in Europe. The editing was finished only a few weeks after the train collision in Buizingen near Halle in Belgium on 15 February 2010. As a matter of fact, we have had two major serious accidents in Europe in less than a year — in Viareggio in June 2009 and the recent one in Buizingen. Around 50 people have been killed in the two accidents and numerous persons have been seriously injured. This reminds us that rail transport is a risky activity and that all possible diligence must be exercised to try to avoid accidents like these. The investigation reports are still not available and it would be premature to draw conclusions on the causes of the accidents.

Experience shows that catastrophes, like the Viareggio and Buizingen accidents, never have a single and simple cause. There is always a complex chain of events and deficiencies that lead to these kinds of accidents. Causes can almost always be traced back to managerial, organisational and human interface factors. A catastrophe is an accident of the organisation. In addition, there are always precursors that, correctly interpreted, should have rung the alarm bell to the management, if it takes care to properly manage safety.

The Railway Safety Directive (2004/49/EC) requires railway undertakings and infrastructure managers to implement a safety management system — actually a pre-condition to obtain a certificate to operate. The key element of such a safety management system is always the commitment from top management, in particular the CEO. He or she must understand that responsibility for managing safety remains at the top level of the company and that it cannot be passed on to operational staff or contractors. If this commitment does not exist the safety management system is more or less void and merely a binder of documents.

Further on in the report the reader may find more information about the concept of safety management and the proposals developed by the Agency to arrive at a common approach to assessment of the safety management systems.



Contents

2	1016	woru					
8	Sum	Summary, commentary and analysis					
	9	The development of safety					
	10	The risk profile of the railways					
		11	Level crossing accidents				
		11	Suicides on railway premises				
14	Safe	ty repo	orting and coordination				
	14	Safety performance					
		14	Reporting of accident statistics and indicators				
		14	Revision of Annex I to the Railway Safety Directive				
		15	Data quality				
	15	Serio	ous accidents				
		15	Reporting of serious accidents and accident investigations				
16	Safe	Safety performance					
	17	Accident types					
	17	Fatalities and injuries					
	19	Suicides					
	20	Precursors to accidents					
	21	Accident costs and other CSIs					
		21	Infrastructure				
		23	Traffic volumes				
24	Serio	ous acc	idents in Europe				
	25	Repo	orting by the investigation bodies				
		26 NIB annual reports					
		26	Historical archive of accidents				
		28	Accidents in Europe				
			28 Zoufftgen accident, France				
			28 Passenger train fire, Bulgaria				
			29 Collision with sheep and derailment, Germany				
			29 Bridge collapse, Czech Republic				
			29 Tunnel fire, Channel Tunnel				
			29 Train collision, Hungary				
			30 Derailment and dangerous goods accident, Viareggio, Italy				
			30 Bridge collapse, Ireland				
			31 Suicides, Germany				
			31 Train collision, Belgium				



- 32 Managing safety
 - 33 Assessing safety management systems
 - 34 Safety certificates issued
 - 34 Common safety targets
 - 34 Safety regulation
 - 35 Further studies on freight train derailments
 - 35 Network of safety authorities
- 36 Challenges and changes: the future of railway safety
 - 37 Development of safety reporting
 - 37 Development of common safety targets
 - 37 Migration to a single safety certificate
 - 37 The future role of the Railway Agency
 - 39 Looking forward
- 41 Annex 1 Common safety indicators
- 54 Annex 2 Serious accidents with five or more fatalities since 1990
- 58 Annex 3 List of national safety authorities and national investigation bodies
- 60 Key documents and references





The development of safety

Railways remain a safe form of transport but further analysis of trends based on common safety indicator (CSI) data cannot be done yet. Even though both the number of accidents and the total number of fatalities fell compared to 2007, there are still a substantial number of unauthorised persons and level crossing users killed and the total reported number of fatalities was higher than in 2006.

The national investigation bodies (NIBs) have notified the Agency of 146 accidents that occurred during 2009. The Agency also received 210 investigation reports during 2009 covering accidents dating from 2006 and onwards. In January 2010, the Agency set up a safety information system which enables the Member States and the industry to disseminate information on safety-critical issues.

The issuing of safety certificates according to the Railway Safety Directive is not proceeding as expected. A review of the annual reports from the national safety authorities (NSAs) shows that a number of countries have not yet issued any certificates and some use a combination of the new and old legislation. The use of dual or old legislation will not be possible as from 1 January 2011, when all railway undertakings (RUs) are required to have a certificate issued according to the Railway Safety Directive.

The Agency has concerns as to whether all pending applications for safety certificates will be processed in time before the deadline of 1 January 2011. Up until now, over 300 certificates have been issued. There are, though, three Member States that have not yet issued any part A certificates and that have a large number of pending applications.

Transparency of national safety rules, particularly during this period of change towards the open market, is one of the key conditions for safe operation of the railways. The Agency has evaluated how some of the requirements contributing to transparency of the rules have been implemented in the Member States. We have concluded that a more systematic and common approach is necessary to ensure the comprehensiveness of the national systems of safety rules and their accessibility.

During 2009 the Agency made available a historical archive of fatal accidents in Europe. The accident data were collected in a research project and the information is stored in our database. The archive contains data on 384 serious accidents which occurred between 1990 and 2005. In this report we present the archive and some of the trends that emerge from the data.

The risk profile of the railways

The railways are generally safe for passengers and employees and this is confirmed by the 2008 data. Single fatality accidents, i.e. unauthorised persons being hit by rolling stock in motion or level crossing accidents, form the major part of the number of fatalities. Railway accidents, collisions, derailments and fires, only cause less than 2 % of the fatalities.

The total number of passengers killed for the period 2006-2008 is 243, a comparatively small figure compared to the total number

of 4 472 persons killed (¹). Most of the passenger fatalities occur when passengers try to embark or disembark trains that are moving. However, there were a number of serious accidents in 2008 that caused a larger number of passenger fatalities. The accidents are described on page 28. The fluctuations in reported number of level crossing fatalities and unauthorised persons killed can be explained by changes in how the Member States classify the victims. Viewed together, the reported numbers are at a stable level during the mentioned period.




Chart 1. Fatalities on European railways 2006-2008

⁽¹⁾ Figures according to CSI data as reported by the NSAs.

Level crossing accidents

The number of level crossing accidents constitutes a substantial share of the total number of accidents. The NSAs have reported a total of 3774 level crossing accidents and 1287 level crossing users killed during the three years 2006-2008.

The reported total number of level crossings fell by 6 % from 2006 to 2007; however, there is a less than 1 % reduction between 2007 and 2008. This indicates changes in reporting procedures and that the figures are not yet fully reliable. The total number of level crossings was over 125 000 for 2008. There is a potential for reductions in the number of fatalities through structured and focused work with level crossing safety.



Suicides on railway premises

The majority of fatalities in the railway system are suicides. The consequences are not only trauma for the other parties involved, but also significant for the cost of delays and costs to the rescue services, police investigations, etc. There is a need for a discussion on the possibilities of reducing the numbers through preventative measures.


Media attention and reporting can adversely affect the number of suicides. As an example, Chart 2 shows the number of suicides per six months in a metro in Austria, where an agreement with the local media dramatically reduced suicides. The number of suicides dropped immediately after the agreement (the red line) and stabilised on a third of the number before the agreement (2). This is the so-called 'Werther effect' (3) and has been shown in several studies. Further, there are indications that simple measures, such as increased lighting in station areas can have a significant effect on reducing the number of suicides (4).


The railways face an even more difficult problem than the metros because of the size of the network. However, identification of 'hotspots' has proved possible. Some studies indicate that up to 75 % of all suicides occur in the vicinity of psychiatric institutions, and measures such as fencing etc. in strategic places can prove effective.

⁽²⁾ G Sonneck, 2003.

⁽¹⁾ After the novel The sorrows of young Werther, by Goethe, where a suicide described in the book led to a series of copycat suicides throughout Europe.

⁽⁴⁾ Effects have been seen in the Berlin and Tokyo metros but so far not scientifically studied.





A research project on suicides and trespasser fatalities is expected to be included in the seventh framework programme (5). This project will be supported by the Agency and will aim at identifying the practices that could be applied to introduce mitigation

measures of different kinds, analyse them and identify the most effective and cost-efficient counteractions to prevent suicides and trespasser fatalities.

⁽⁵⁾ European Commission's research programme.



Safety reporting and coordination

Safety performance

Reporting of accident statistics and indicators

The third set of common safety indicators (CSIs) was largely reported on time and with less need for corrections than previous years' submissions.

The common safety indicators to be reported to the Agency are laid down in Annex I to the Railway Safety Directive with definitions to be found in the Eurostat regulation. Member States are also required to report accident data to Eurostat.

Revision of Annex I to the Railway Safety Directive

A revised Annex I to the Railway Safety Directive was published on 27 November 2009. This new annex provides, for the first time, a set of safety indicators to be reported according to common definitions and calculation methods.

Accident statistics

Railway accidents and incidents reporting is required in two separate EU legislative acts.

- The Eurostat regulation ((EC) No 2003/91) requires reporting data to Eurostat.
- The Railway Safety Directive (2004/49/EC) requires reporting data to the Railway Agency.

The Railway Safety Directive requires the NSAs to report significant accidents as defined in Regulation (EC) No 2003/91. According to this regulation, the Member States may use national definitions of the indicators during the first five years.

""Significant accident" means any accident involving at least one rail vehicle in motion, resulting in at least one killed or seriously injured person, or in significant damage to stock, track, other installations or environment, or extensive disruptions to traffic. Accidents in workshops, warehouses and depots are excluded' (91/2003/EC).

Data quality

The work on improving data quality has continued using the same approach developed for the previous years' submissions. All the indicators have been checked for consistency and fluctuation, and a comparison with the Eurostat data has been carried out. There are continuous improvements in data quality; this year it has also been possible to update the data reported in previous years. Therefore, the CSI tables in the annex to this report replace the tables published in previous reports.

Serious accidents

Reporting of serious accidents and accident investigations

Independent accident investigation is a key element of learning lessons from accidents and incidents. Even though all Member States except one have established an independent investigation body, the Agency still has concerns as to whether the organisation and the procedures in some Member States comply with the requirements of the directive.

The Railway Safety Directive requires the Member States to set up an independent accident investigation body that shall notify the Agency of any investigations opened as well as to send the full investigation report when the investigation is closed. In 2009, the national investigation bodies notified the Agency of 190 investigations opened and submitted 210 investigation reports. The information is publicly available in the Agency's database ERADIS.

National investigation bodies

According to Article 21 of the Railway Safety Directive, each Member State is required to set up a permanent investigation body with responsibility for investigating serious accidents and incidents.

The NIBs should investigate serious accidents, defined as an accident with at least one fatality, or five seriously injured persons, or with an immediate estimated monetary cost of at least EUR 2 million.

The investigation bodies should notify the Agency within one week of the opening of an investigation into a serious accident and should send a full investigation report normally within one year, after the occurrence of a serious accident.

The accident report should 'contain, where appropriate, safety recommendations'. The recommendations should be addressed to the safety authorities, which must report back to the investigation body on actions taken.



Safety performance

Accident types

Accidents to persons caused by rolling stock in motion and level crossing accidents constitute around 75 % of the total number of accidents on the railways, suicides excluded (6). The graph below presents the number of accidents per accident type. The emerging pattern, a big decrease in the reported number of accidents from 2006 to 2007, can be explained by the reporting of two countries.

Germany reported all collisions of trains in 2006, because significant accidents could not be extracted. Similarly, Bulgaria reported all accidents in 2006, specifically 1 630 'Other' accidents. Excluding these non-significant Bulgarian 'Other' accidents and the German collisions from the dataset, gives 4 726 accidents in 2006 in total; this is closer to the totals for 2007 and 2008.

The chart illustrates that the reporting was developing in 2006 and that it takes time to establish a reporting regime. The situation had improved in 2007 and was confirmed by the figures reported for 2008.




Chart 3. Reported number of accidents per accident type 2006-2008

Fatalities and injuries

The majority of the reported fatalities are for unauthorised persons and level crossing users. The most common type of accident is trespassers hit by rolling stock in motion. Passenger fatalities account for only 5 % of the total number of deaths.

In Chart 5, showing the reported number of fatalities per victim type and year, there are big fluctuations in the reported numbers for fatalities to level crossing users and unauthorised persons. However, by adding together the number of level crossing fatalities and fatalities of unauthorised persons, year by year, we obtain a series of 1 306, 1 271 and 1 275, which are remarkably stable figures. This clearly indicates that the Member States are still in a learning process on how to classify fatalities and it is probable that this applies

⁽⁶⁾ Calculation based on corrected figures for 'Other accidents' for BG and Collisions for DE, as explained in the text, using 4 726 as total number of accidents 2006.

for all indicators. The total number of employee fatalities has remained at 38 for all three years. This is a coincidence as there is some variation in the figures reported by the Member States, as can be seen in Table 1 in Annex 1.

Chart 4. Fatalities per victim type 2006-2008





Chart 5. Reported number of fatalities per victim type 2006-2008



A number of NSAs have reported changes in reporting procedures or definitions applied in the data collection. This can also be seen in Chart 6. For serious injuries, the reported numbers of injured passengers and unauthorised persons show large variations beyond what might be expected from natural fluctuation.

The graph shows a rather large drop in the number of passenger injuries from 2006 to 2007. There is no single value that can explain this, a number of countries have reported a reduction in the number of passenger injuries that together account for the total reduction. The majority of the countries show variation in the reporting for 2006-2008 for all victim types. A better understanding of the trends and patterns will come when the 2009 data is reported.




Chart 6. Reported number of serious injuries per victim type 2006–2008

Suicides

Suicides are reported separately from accident fatalities. Suicides represent 62 % of the casualties and, together with the unauthorised persons, constitute 83 % of the fatalities occurring within the railway system. The Member States use different ways of classifying the fatalities. The revised Annex 1 and its guidance will lead to a more harmonised approach to classifying suicides.




Chart 7. Suicides and total deaths 2006-2008

Precursors to accidents

'Precursors to accidents' refers to indicators measuring incidents that under other circumstances would have led to an accident. There are indicators for broken rails, track buckles, signals passed at danger, wrong-side signalling failures, broken wheels and broken axles.

The reported number of track buckles has reduced from 7 803 in 2006 to 835 in 2008, and the reported number of signals passed at danger (SPADs) has increased threefold. The differences are mainly accounted for by Italy and Poland which have changed definitions during the period, as is apparent in Table 1.

Following the accident in Viareggio in Italy in 2009, the Agency has established a task force on freight wagon maintenance in cooperation with the Member States. Among the objectives of the task force are the review, exchange and analysis of information relating to problems with broken axles/fatigue and relevant testing methods, the proposal or development of appropriate controls

	IT Track buckles	PL SPADs
2006	6 743	No data
2007	3 113	4 113
2008	41	2 653

Table 1. Italian track buckles and Polish SPADs 2006–2008

and monitoring tools, the proposal of measures to review the different maintenance regimes existing across Europe and the drawing up of a programme for further harmonisation. Within this scope, the Agency has also conducted a survey among the NSAs on the number of broken axles and wheels. The aim of the survey was to review the figures reported to the Agency and the definitions used. The survey showed that most NSAs only reported cracks in wheels and axles that led to an accident. Only one country, Germany, included cracks detected during regular maintenance, which is in accordance with the guidance for the revised Annex I to the Railway Safety Directive. Germany reported three cracks that led to accidents in 2008, and a total of 752 cracks. This means that the figures reported for broken wheels and axles, displayed in Chart 8, only show a part of the situation. The survey also showed that problems with hot boxes are of more concern than cracks in wheels and axles.



Chart 8. Precursors to accidents

Accident costs and other CSIs

The data on the cost of accidents show wide variation and it is evident to the Agency that the Member States have problems in establishing reporting regimes for accident cost data. The revised Annex I to the Railway Safety Directive will require the NSAs to use the willingness-to-pay approach using estimates of the Value for Preventing a Fatality (VPF). They can either estimate a national value or use the reference values given in the Agency's guidance. It is foreseen that this will simplify the work for the Member States and will lead to a consistent and harmonised approach. The Agency will start analysing data on the cost of accidents starting when the 2010 accident indicators are submitted.

Infrastructure

Three CSIs concern railway infrastructure, one is a measure of the coverage of automatic train protection systems on the lines;

the other is the number of level crossings, normalised by the length of the network expressed in track km and the third gives information on the level of protection at level crossings.

Automatic train protection

Definition:

'Automatic Train Protection (ATP)' means a system that enforces obedience to signals and speed restrictions by speed supervision, including automatic stop at signals.

Guidance:

Systems where track signalling information is substituted and/or supplemented by cab signalling are included.


The part of the definition relating to 'automatic stop at signals' is intended to include also automatic stops at conflict points between clearance gauges.






⁽⁷⁾ CT is the abbreviation for Channel Tunnel.

Chart 10. Number of level crossings per track km 2006-2008 (8)



 $(^{8})$ $\,$ CT is the abbreviation for Channel Tunnel.


Chart 11. Percentage of level crossings with automatic or manual protection (9)



(9) CT is the abbreviation for Channel Tunnel.


Traffic volumes

Chart 12. Number of million passenger kilometres (10)




(10) CT is the abbreviation for Channel Tunnel.

Chart 13. Number of million train km (11)



(11) CT is the abbreviation for Channel Tunnel.



Reporting by the investigation bodies

The Agency's public database of safety documents includes notifications of investigations and reports submitted by the investigation bodies.

Chart 14 shows the trend in the submissions of notifications and investigation reports. Even though the majority of the investigation reports are submitted within one year it is also clear that a substantial number of investigations take a longer time. At the end of 2009 there were still 157 open investigations for accidents that occurred 2006-2008, which shows that the final reports for 28 % of all investigations were not submitted within 12 months. Some Member States report a lack of resources as the main reason for not being able to finish all the notified investigations.



Chart 14. Open and completed investigations 2007-2009

The chart also shows that not all accident investigations are notified to the Agency within a week. The Railway Safety Directive requires the NIBs to notify the Agency of opened investigations within one week of opening an investigation. Looking only at the notifications submitted during 2009, the pattern becomes even more visible.

Chart 15 shows the time span between occurrence and notification. Some 48 of the 190 notifications received in 2009 referred to investigations of accidents that occurred 2008 or earlier. The Agency will look further into this and the reporting procedures of the NIBs.

NIB annual reports

The annual reports submitted by the NIBs show large variation in the activities of the investigation bodies. The Agency received 23 annual reports for 2008. The number of investigations opened during 2008 varies from 0 to over 50, and the number of recommendations issued from 0 to over 180.

Historical archive of accidents

In a research project the Agency has collected data on serious accidents for the period 1990–2007. The accident archive is publicly available in our database, accessible through the Agency's website at the following address: http://pdb.era.europa.eu. The criterion for including an accident in the archive was the definition of a serious accident, as given in the Railway Safety Directive. For the purpose of the project, a list of specific scenarios for inclusion or exclusion of accidents was set up.

The project identified 402 accidents, of which 382 were not previously known to ERA. The initial list of accidents was set up through a media and news report search. The list was then completed and verified by the National Investigation Bodies. Regarding the completeness of the data, the project concluded that the coverage and accuracy of data was satisfactory for the following accident types:


- Fatal train collisions, derailments and fires.
- Level crossing accidents with on-train fatalities.
- Other accidents with four or more fatalities.

Table 2 lists all rail accidents in Europe with 15 or more fatalities since 1990.

In Annex 2 there is a list of all accidents with five or more fatalities.

Chart 15. Time span between accident occurrence and notification submitted to the Agency.

Notifications submitted during 2009.



< 1 week	21 %
< 1 month and > 1 week	23 %
< 6 months and > 1 month	42 %
> 6 months	15 %


Date	Country	Place	Туре	Fatalities	Injuries
02/02/1990	DE	Rüsselsheim station	Train collision	17	37
21/08/1990	PL	Wlochy	Train collision	16	42
17/10/1991	FR	Melun Station, near Paris	Train collision	16	50
26/09/1992	HU	Agárd, Gárdony	LC accident	16	0
02/12/1994	HU	Szajol station	Derailment	31	54
24/06/1995	CZ	Krouna	Train collision	19	4
31/03/1997	ES	Uharte Arakil station, Navarra	Derailment	18	40
03/06/1998	DE	Eschede	Derailment	101	87
05/10/1999	UK	Ladbroke Grove, London	Train collision	31	227
04/01/2000	NO	Asta	Train collision	19	18
08/05/2003	HU	Lake Balaton	LC accident	33	7
03/06/2003	ES	Chinchilla/Navajuelos	Train collision	19	6
07/01/2005	IT	Bolognina di'Crevalcore	Train collision	17	15
29/06/2009	IT	Viareggio	Derailment	32	27
15/02/2010	BE	Buizingen station	Train collision	18	83 (*)

Table 2. Accidents in Europe with more than 15 fatalities since 1990. *Source:* ERA historical archive of railway accidents, notifications submitted by NIBs and other sources.

(*) The number of fatalities and serious injuries in the Halle accident as per 19 March 2010. Figures can change. LC accident means Level crossing accident.

There are several ways to analyse the data. Chart 16 shows the number of fatal accidents with at least five fatalities and the number of fatalities in these accidents. There is a slight downward trend in the number of fatal accidents per year.

Chart 16. Fatal train accidents with five or more fatalities 1990–2009. *Source:* ERA Accident Archive combined with ERADIS database containing accident notifications submitted by the national investigation bodies.



The outcome, the number of fatalities per year, does not show the same trend. The accidents in Eschede, Germany, in 1998, with 101 fatalities, and the Viareggio accident in Italy in 2009, with 32 fatalities, have obvious clear impact on the totals for those years.

Accidents in Europe

Each year a number of very serious accidents with passenger or train crew fatalities occur. This section contains descriptions of a selection of accidents and events that have been exceptionally severe or that have implications for the management of safety and contains information that is of interest on a European level. More information about the accidents can be found in the Agency's database at the web address http://pdb.era.europa.eu.

Zoufftgen accident, France

On 11 October 2006, a freight train and a regional express train collided head-on on the border between France and Luxembourg, near Zoufftgen. In February 2009, the final report on the train collision was published. The accident led to the death of six people, one seriously injured person and 15 lightly injured persons.

At the time, only one of the two tracks was used because of maintenance work. The investigation showed that the direct cause of the accident was communications error: 'the Traffic Controller of the Bettembourg Central Control Post mistakenly issued the driver of the RET an order to pass through the "danger" signal protecting the section of track on which the freight train was travelling' (12). A number of underlying causes for this error were identified.

The investigation led to 22 recommendations addressing a range of issues; regulations and routines for staff in command control centres, communication and warning equipment and procedures which focus on cross-border aspects; as well as more technical aspects such as faults in signalling equipment.



Image 1. Train collision, Zoufftgen, France, 11 October 2006. Photo: French NIB

Passenger train fire, Bulgaria

Nine passengers were killed and 10 were seriously injured when a sleeping coach caught fire on 28 February 2008 on the line between the railway stations Kunino and Cherven Briyag. Train staff tried to evacuate passengers and fight the fire using on-board extinguishers, the train was stopped on the line and unsuccessful attempts were made to disconnect the coach on fire from the rest of the train.

The investigation conducted by the Bulgarian NIB concluded that the fire was caused by an electrical failure in the lighting of one of the compartments. This resulted in sparking and intensive heat, which destroyed the insulation material in the roof of the coach and produced a flammable gas which ignited and exploded, and led to the fire in the compartment.



Image 2. Passenger train fire, Bulgaria, 28 February 2008. Photo: Bulgarian NIB

⁽ 12) Investigation report, English translation, Summary on page 14.

Collision with sheep and derailment, Germany

On 26 April 2008, 22 people were seriously injured when a high speed passenger train hit a herd of sheep at the entrance to the Landrücken tunnel south of Fulda, and subsequently derailed and impacted against the tunnel walls.

The German investigation body issued recommendations on aspects of the design of high speed trains, communication during operation and between the railway undertaking, infrastructure manager and the rescue services.

Bridge collapse, Czech Republic

On 8 August 2008 a motorway road bridge above the Studenka station collapsed just in front of an approaching Eurocity train travelling at 134 km/h. An emergency braking by the driver reduced the speed to 90 km/h. The train collided with the ruins of the bridge and derailed. Derailed carriages consequently collided with an infrastructure works train waiting in the station. The accident led to seven fatalities and 88 injuries. An eighth victim subsequently died two months later. The total damage is estimated to have been around EUR 2.5 million. The bridge was undergoing repairs and the investigation showed that regulations were not observed by the construction company.



Image 3. Bridge collapse, Czech republic, 8 August 2008. Photo: Czech NIB

Tunnel fire, Channel Tunnel

A road vehicle on a shuttle train caught fire during transit through the Channel Tunnel on 11 September 2008. The train crew and passengers escaped to a safe place in the adjacent service tunnel and there were no injuries. The material damage was substantial as the fire spread to all 27 vehicles on the shuttle, damaging both the tunnel infrastructure and the train.

The French national investigation body has conducted an accident investigation, however, no investigation report has been released at the time of editing this report.

Train collision, Hungary

A failure of the signal system on a line between Pilis and Monor stations on 6 October 2008 led to a collision between an intercity train and a regional passenger train. The intercity train left the Pilis station first and travelled at 15 km/hour. In the following regional passenger train, the driver did not follow the rules to run at the permitted speed, and accelerated the train to 100 km/hour. Since the interlocking system was out of order and the automatic train protection was inactivated, the passenger train ran into the end of the intercity train and collided at a speed of 71 km/hour. The collision caused four passenger fatalities and four persons were seriously injured.



Image 4. Train collision, Hungary, 6 October 2008. Photo: Hungarian NIB

Derailment and dangerous goods accident, Viareggio, Italy

Some 32 persons were killed and 27 persons seriously injured by a gas explosion when a freight train derailed in Viareggio in northern Italy on Monday, 29 June 2009. The accident occurred at 23.48 local time on the approach to Viareggio Station.

The train involved in the accident consisted of 14 tank wagons that carried liquefied petroleum gas (LPG). Following the derailment, one of the wagons was punctured, gas leaked out and, after a few minutes the gas cloud, which spread out over the station and a nearby street, exploded causing severe damage to the station and the houses and leading to fatalities in the surroundings.

The preliminary investigation showed that the cause of the accident was a broken axle on one of the overturned cars. The accident investigation opened by the Italian investigation body is to be completed by mid-2010.



Image 5. Freight train derailment, Viareggio, Italy 29 June 2009.

Bridge collapse, Ireland

At 18.07 on 21 August 2009, a train driver, travelling between Donabate and Malahide Stations over the Broadmeadow Estuary in north County Dublin, reported a partial collapse of the Malahide viaduct. The viaduct is a 176-metre wide structure, with 11 stone masonry piers, which support a pre-stressed, precast concrete deck.

The train driver immediately called the signaller, who isolated the track section on the viaduct and stopped all train services travelling over the viaduct. A rock causeway runs between the piers of the viaduct mitigating the effects of tidal flow on the viaduct. When the Irish investigation body arrived at the site, one of the middle supporting masonry piers of the viaduct had crumbled, causing a 20-metre section of the deck (track, sleepers and ballast) to collapse.

Initial investigations of the viaduct structure indicate that scour undermining of the pier was a causal factor to the accident. The investigation body is continuing its investigations and a report on the accident is expected to be released within one year.



Suicides, Germany

On 10 November 2009, a well-known German football goalkeeper committed suicide by throwing himself in front of a train. This event triggered a wave of suicides, significantly increasing the number of suicides on the railways in the weeks following the incident (¹³). It is a well-known fact that tragic events like this lead to an increase in suicides. The German railways had previously managed to bring down the number of suicides, partly as a result of agreements with the press not to publish information on suicides. However, in a case like this, media attention and publicity were unavoidable and the following increase in suicides inevitable.

Train collision, Belgium

In the morning rush hour of 15 February 2010, two passenger trains collided at Buizingen station, 2 km north of Halle in Belgium. The accident forced one train to plough deep into the front carriage of the other, ripping open and totally destroying another carriage. There were some 300 passengers on the two trains and the accident caused the death of 19 people and a total of 171 injured.

The devastation at the accident scene was enormous and there was also substantial damage to the overhead power lines, as two of the carriages were forced up into the air by the collision.

The Belgian investigation body has started an investigation into the causes of the accident.



Image 7. Train collision at Buizingen station, Belgium, 15 February 2010. Photo: Belgian NIB

⁽¹³⁾ Information given by the German NSA.



Assessing safety management systems

The Railway Safety Directive requires national safety authorities to assess the safety management systems of railway undertakings and infrastructure managers. If the SMS meets requirements set out in the Railway Safety Directive the NSA can issue a safety certificate to a RU or an authorisation to an infrastructure manager. This is known as part A certification. The part B certificate is the network–specific requirements relating to the infrastructure and/or the vehicles used and operated. Part A certificates for railway undertakings are valid throughout the EU whereas the RUs will need to obtain a Part B certificate for each Member State that they operate in.


The Agency issued draft assessment criteria in 2007 for NSAs to use when assessing the safety management system relevant for the part A certificate. The criteria, that together with a set of principles for both the assessment process and the supervision regime form the common safety method on conformity assessment (CSM on CA), is due to become a regulation in 2010. The use of this method will help to ensure trust between Member States, assist railway undertakings to gain access to networks in different Member States and form a first step in the migration towards a single certificate.

Safety management systems

A safety management system (SMS) is a documented process for managing risks and it integrates the operation of the railway, the vehicles and the infrastructure.

It is an important way of demonstrating that railway undertakings and infrastructure managers are operating and maintaining their part of the railway systems.

A harmonisation of the assessment of SMS ensures that the market is open and competitive because each Member State will be adopting a consistent and transparent process for managing safety.



Safety certificates issued

Up until now, 19 NSAs have used the Railway Safety Directive to award certificates. The rest are either using the provisions of previous legislation (Directive 2001/14) or a combination. NSAs have until 1 January 2011 before they are required to issue certificates and authorisations according to the Railway Safety Directive. A review of the NSA annual reports also shows that only three countries, Czech Republic, France and Norway, have issued part B certificates for a RU from another country, six certificates in total.

No		Have	Part A certificates		Part B certificates	
140		Tiuve	Issued	Pending	Issued	Pending
19	NSAs	Used RSD 2004/49 to issue certificates	337	50	(*)	70
2	NSAs	Used RSD 2004/49 to issue certificates but did not notify the Agency	4	12	1	14
3	NSAs	Have applications for certificates but not issued any	0	45	0	56
Total			341	57	(*)	140

Table 3. Safety certificates issued and pending. *Source:* ERA database ERADIS and NSA Annual reports. Data as per 30 January 2010.

(*) The Agency has no reliable information in its database on the number of part B certificates issued. There is no requirement to notify the Agency when a part B certificate is issued.

The Agency has concerns that those Member States that have not yet issued certificates according to the Railway Safety Directive, Germany, Italy and Greece, will not be able to issue certificates on time. If this is not achieved by the end of 2010, the railway undertakings in these countries will not be able to provide any service.

Common safety targets

Common safety targets are quantitative tools intended to monitor that current safety levels of the railways in the Member States are at least maintained. In the long term, they are also intended to help in reducing the current differences in safety performance.

In 2009, a Commission Decision (2009/460/EC) entered into force and established a method for calculating common safety targets (CSTs) and national reference values (NRVs). During the year, the Agency completed the work with Eurostat to increase data quality and correct errors in the reporting.

The first set of CSTs and NRVs was calculated, based on Eurostat data, and was included in a recommendation delivered to the Commission in September 2009 and was published in the Official Journal on 22 July 2010 as Commission Decision 2010/409/EC.

In the first half of 2010, the Agency will carry out the first assessment of achievement of the first set of CSTs, based on four-year time series of Eurostat data on railway accidents, covering the period 2005–08.

Safety regulation

In several Member States, the safety regulatory framework is still undergoing significant development. The Agency has begun an evaluation of the national measures implementing the Railway Safety Directive in the Member States at the request of the Commission. The Agency also evaluates the notifications and registers the rules in the Agency's public database, which now contains the notified rules of most Member States.

The transparency and availability of the national safety rules that should be used by the railway undertakings operating on the railway network is important to the opening up of the market. The Directive requires Member States to notify the Commission of new and amended rules (14). The Commission monitors and reviews the introduction of new national rules. The long-term objective of the Railway Safety Directive is the gradual reduction of national rules in order to move to a more harmonised European approach.

During 2009, the Agency published a report on the evaluation of the way in which national safety rules are published and made available in the Member States (15). The conclusions drawn from the evaluation listed below.

- All notified national safety rules are published and made available, but are not necessarily easy to find.
- The Agency has concerns that the system of national safety rules is not yet comprehensive, as the measures to establish all the safety rules necessary for a safe railway operation have not yet been fully implemented.
- Particular attention should be paid to the infrastructure manager and railway undertaking rules in the development of the
 national safety regulatory framework as in many Member States there is restricted consultation on the draft rules, and the safety
 rules are not easily accessible for the stakeholders.
- A more systematic and common approach by the safety authorities is necessary to ensure accessibility to the safety rules for all stakeholders, particularly applicants for safety certification.

On the basis of these conclusions, the Agency has issued a recommendation addressed to the Commission (16).

Further studies on freight train derailments

In May 2009 the Agency recommended the Commission not to adopt, in Community laws, a new measure for dangerous goods wagons proposed by the RID Committee of Experts. The proposed device, giving a significant share of false alarms, would increase disturbances to freight services, and would also introduce new unsolved problems both in interoperability and safety. The balance between potential advantages and disadvantages was therefore likely to be negative for the overall railway system.

Following extensive discussions, and taking into account the case of rare but potentially catastrophic accidents, EU Member States adopted a Community position agreeing with the Agency's recommendation and considered it necessary to undertake an exhaustive analysis of potential new measures, leading to clear benefits for the railway system. The new scope of analysis covers all freight trains and will allow the Agency to study the best options for preventing derailments or reducing their consequences. The results of the study will be available in 2012.




Network of safety authorities

A series of peer reviews has taken place, with the purpose of learning and sharing information on the methods used by the safety authorities in assessments of applications for safety certificates. The peer reviews are meetings held with a limited number of authorities where the working methods and process are presented and discussed. The reviews are seen as a good way for creating trust, giving information on the working methods and learning from each other. The network of authorities decided in 2009 to widen the scope of peer reviews to authorisations for placing in service because of the useful results of peer review on safety certification.

⁽¹⁴⁾ Article 8(2) and (4), The Railway Safety Directive 2004/49/EC.

^{(15) &#}x27;Evaluation of the way in which national safety rules are published and made available', ERA/REP/04-2009/SAF and ERA/INF/02-2009/SAF.

⁽¹⁶⁾ ERA/REC/04-2009/SAF.



Development of safety reporting

The Agency is developing during 2010 the reporting tools for the NSAs and the NIBs. In order to improve data quality and reduce workload for the NSAs and the Agency, an automatic data quality check of CSI data will be developed. Upon upload of CSI data, the NSA will be presented with a data quality report and given a possibility to check and correct their data before submission to the Agency.

Further, a new system for notifications and reporting of accidents will enable a more flexible and rational handling of data, provide added value and functionality for the NIBs and improve the possibilities of dissemination of information for the Agency. A first version of the system will be developed during 2010 and put in service during 2011.

Development of common safety targets

In 2010 the Agency starts working on the future developments of CSTs and NRVs and will evaluate the possibility of developing NRVs and CSTs also for parts of the railway system as well as for accident precursors. To this end, pilot projects at national level could be launched in this year.

The possibility of using EU funding resources to support the Member States to achieve, in the future, more demanding safety targets, will be evaluated with a view to preparing the ground for the second set of CSTs and NRVs.

Migration to a single safety certificate

The Agency is, during 2010, evaluating the development of safety certification by the NSAs. The evaluation will form the basis of a recommendation to the Commission on strategies for migration towards a single Community Safety certificate. The single common safety certificate will allow RUs to operate freely across borders using one certificate accepted by all NSAs.

From the information currently available (17), it is evident that not all Member States have developed and applied the necessary administrative procedures to ensure an effective application of the Railway Safety Directive. Without these procedures in place it is likely that it will take time for all Member States and NSAs to be on an equal footing. The adoption of the CSM on conformity assessment will help but it is likely that additional elements, like for example the CSM on risk assessment or the development of the certification of the entity in charge of maintenance, will need to be in place before the long-term objective of a fully open and competitive rail market will be achieved. This will come when we have a fully mature and safe railway system which has the SMS at the heart of its operation. The Agency will work together with the European railway actors to achieve this.

The future role of the Railway Agency

The Agency has played a crucial role in the development of railway safety in Europe following the implementation of the Railway Safety Directive into national legislations. In the beginning, the Agency had more of a regulatory role, producing recommendations to the European Commission. This role has been transformed to assisting the Member States in a number of areas, from establishing the safety authorities and investigation bodies, giving advice in the implementation process of the Railway Safety Directive into national legislation, through setting up networks and establishing reporting procedures and routines, to development of recommendations, guidance, safety targets and safety methods. The role has so far been more focused on helping and supporting the Member States rather than monitoring and controlling.

There is still work to be done and many Member States need help in establishing a safety regime according to the Railway Safety Directive. The Agency believes it to be important to continue the

⁽¹¹) Information received in the peer reviews and impact assessments of the CSM on conformity assessment.

current work and have a good working relationship between the Agency and the national bodies and authorities.

However, the role of the Agency will change in the future. With the first set of safety targets to become EU law during this year, and the development of a second, possibly more demanding set under way, the role will change to more of a monitoring role, and this is likely to affect the relationship between the national bodies and authorities and the Agency.

The Agency and the safety authorities have also established a reflection group that, in a series of meetings, will work on the future role of the Agency, of the safety authorities and of the cooperation between the NSAs and the Agency. The reflection group will look at the need for more structured auditing activities as a measure to ensure the correct application of the Railway

Safety Directive by the safety authorities when assessing the safety management systems in the certification processes and by the investigation bodies when investigating serious accidents.

There are also requests for the Agency to take a more active role in certain areas, recently reinforced by the tragic events at Viareggio in Italy and Halle in Belgium. The Agency has provided support to the Italian and Belgian investigation bodies and also, after the Viareggio accident, developed special taskforces for freight wagon maintenance to give a European perspective to the problems.

It will be a challenge for the Agency to manage these partly conflicting requirements in the future. There will be a need for a discussion on the focus of the future role of the Agency and how it can help in the work for a safe and modern European railway.



Looking forward

The year 2010 promises to be a challenging year for the railway safety sector in Europe. The tragic events in Italy and recently in Belgium are a clear reminder that we cannot lean back and relax. The work for a safe modern and competitive railway sector will continue and accelerate

In 2010 we will see results of the work in the freight wagon maintenance task force, with possible effects on the procedures and standards for inspection and maintenance of axles. 2010 is also the last year that railway undertakings can provide services under the provisions of previous legislations. From 1 January 2011 all railway undertakings must have a certificate issued under the Railway Safety Directive 2004/39/EC. It will be a challenge for certain Member States to get up to speed with the assessment of RUs applications and issuing certificates. The end goal is a better platform for a migration to a single European certificate and the work will start during this year.

The key issue will be the development of the safety management systems of the railway undertakings and the infrastructure

managers and the NSAs ability to assess and supervise their application. A sound and systematic way of managing risks can be achieved through the establishment of safety management systems that comply with the requirements of the Railway Safety Directive. For many countries, there is a lot of work still to be done.

The revised Annex I to the Railway Safety Directive requires the Member States to comply with harmonised definitions when reporting accident and incident data. This will provide a better platform for understanding trends and patterns in safety performance and will, in the future, be a solid ground for evaluation of performance against the safety targets.

The national investigation bodies will face new challenges and new common methods and approaches will be developed. Training courses at a European level can help in guiding investigators in looking deeper into the underlying and root causes of accidents, and to analyse the safety management systems when investigating accidents. This will shed new light on the safety performance of the railways in the European Union

Annexes

41	Annex 1 — Cor	mmon	safety indicators
	41		List of tables
	42	2	CSI data tables
	52	2	Comments on CSI data tables
54	Annex 2 — Ser	rious a	accidents with five or more fatalities since 1990
58	Annex 3 — List	st of na	ational safety authorities
	and national in	investi	gation bodies
60	Key documents	ts and	references

Annex 1 — Common safety indicators

List of tables

Table number	Name
_	Fatalities by category of person
2	Serious injuries by category of person
3A	Fatalities by type of accident and person category — 2006
3B	Fatalities by type of accident and person category — 2007
3C	Fatalities by type of accident and person category — 2008
4A	Serious injuries by type of accident and person category — 2006
48	Serious injuries by type of accident and person category — 2007
4C	Serious injuries by type of accident and person category — 2008
5	Total and relative number of suicides
9	Number of accidents by type of accidents
7	Number of precursors to accidents
ω	Costs of all accidents
6	Hours lost due to accidents
10	Technical safety of infrastructure and its implementation
11	Management of safety — number of audits planned and conducted

CSI data tables

Figures with a green background have a comment in the list of comments on pages 52 and 53.

Table 1 — Fatalities by category of person

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ZI.	90	77	38	90	70	38	90	77	38	90	77	38	90	77	38	90	77	38	90	77	38	90	77	98
Victim types – fatalities Years	2006	2007	2008	2006	2007	2008	g users 2006	2007	2008	d persons 2006	2007	2008	s 2006	2007	2008	2006	2007	2008	ain km 2006	2007	2008	assenger 2006	2007	2008
Victim types -	Passengers			Employees			Level crossing users			Unauthorised persons			Other persons			Total persons			Number of train km	(million)		Number of passenger	km (million)	
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Table 2 — Serious injuries by category of person

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× 32 92 2 띯 8 34 0 0 257 253 0 0 0 12 3 0 23 56 0 0 0 19 0 0 42 ⊋ 22 22 4 37 용 38 37 - 5 2 2 Œ S 4 0 4 0 33 0 0 ш 2 0 2 0 0 20 Table 3A - 2006 - Fatalities by type of accident and person category ш 9 0 - 0 2 0 13 0 0 -9 S ß 142 118 Ŋ 0 0 0 0 33 0 0 0 9 0 D 98 뮒 ΑT 22 Victim types – fatalities Unauthorised persons Unauthorised persons Unauthorised persons Unauthorised persons Unauthorised persons Unauthorised persons Level crossing users Other persons Other persons Other persons Other persons Other persons Passengers Employees Passengers Total Total Total Total Total Total Accidents to persons T caused by rolling stock P in motion Derailments of trains Fires in rolling stock Collisions of trains Other accidents Level crossing accidents Accident types JK02 JK02 K03 K03 .K03 K04 ¥04 -K04 DK04 K05 20X05 5 160 K02 SK03 SK04 -K05 -K05

Table 3B — 2007 — Fatalities by type of accident and person category

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1K01	Collisions of trains	Total	0	0	0	0	-	-	0	0 2		0		2	0	-	0	0		0	-	0	0	0	0		0	10
PK01		Passengers	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 0		0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0
SK01		Employees	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	0 0		0		_	0	0	0	0		0	_	0	0	0	0		0	m
1K01		Level crossing users	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0		0		0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0		0	-
UKOJ		Unauthorised persons	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 2		0		0	0	-	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0		0	m
0K01		Other persons	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 0		0		-	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0		0	m
TK02	Derailments of trains	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 0		0		0	0	0	0	0		0	0	m	0	0	0		_	4
PK02		Passengers	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 0		0		0	0	0	0	0		0	0	-	0	0	0		_	2
SK02		Employees	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0		0	2
TK02		Level crossing users	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UK02		Unauthorised persons	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 0		0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0
0K02		Other persons	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 0		0		0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0
TK03	Level crossing	Total	33	8	22	0	23	99	22	9		10		63	-	16	9	4		0	88	20	69	6	6		13	555
PK03	accidents	Passengers	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	0		0		9	0	0	0	0		0	-	0	0	0	0		0	-
SK03		Employees	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0		0	0	0	0	0		0	2	0	0	0	0		0	m
LK03		Level crossing users	33	19	22	0	23	99	22	9		10		24	-	16	9	4		0	81	20	39	6	6		13	485
UK03		Unauthorised persons	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0		32	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	10	0	0		0	42
OK03		Other persons	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0		-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	16	0	0		0	17
TK04	Accidents to persons		16	18	22	0	-	111	2	8		80		6	-	51	30	24		2	264	35	121	14	00	42	44	927
PK04	caused by rolling stock	* Passengers	-	- 80	2	0	0	8	0	0 0		0		-	0	22	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0		2	25
SK04		Employees	3	c	-	0	0	7	0	1		-	-	-	0	8	0	1		0	0	3	0	0	0		2	27
IK04		Level crossing users	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	- 0	- 0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	19	0	0	0	0	19
UK04		Unauthorised persons	12	7	19	0	-	88	2	0 11		7		0	-	43	30	21	-	2	260	32	28	14	- 8		33	713
0K04		Other persons	0	0	0	0	0	13	0	7 C	0 0	0		0	0	0	0	2	0	0	4	0	74	0	0		7	116
TK05	Fires in rolling stack	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 0		0		0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
PK05		Passengers	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 0		0		0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0
SK05		Employees	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 0	0 0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TK05		Level crossing users	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	- 0	- 0	0		0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UK05		Unauthorised persons	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 0		0		0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
0K05		Other persons	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 0	0 0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
JK06	Other accidents	Total	33	0	0	0	0	2	_	0 0		0		9	-	0	0	0		0	80	0	0	0	0	0	0	24
PK06		Passengers	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 0		0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	80	0	0	0	0	0	0	00
SK06		Employees	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0 0	0 0	0		-	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	m
90XI		Level crossing users	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	- 0	0	0		2	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
90XN		Unauthorised persons	2	0	0	0	0	0	_	0 0	0 0	0		33	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	9
0K06		Other persons	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 0		0		0	-	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2

0 4 42 0 0 0 0 13 39 0 0 0 0 257 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0 34 0 0 0 6 0 2 0 8 로 2 62 0 8 38 0 0 0 0 - 8 3 Œ 0 0 2 0 88 0 2 0 5 0 0 0 23 0 0 ^ 0 - 9 0 0 ∞ o o 0 Ш 0 -0 0 2 0 0 X 出 Ŋ Б BG 띪 9 9 = M 17 17 0 8 17 fatalities Unauthorised persons Unauthorised persons Unauthorised persons Jnauthorised persons Unauthorised persons Jnauthorised persons Level crossing users Other persons Other persons Other persons Other persons Other persons Other persons Victim types – Passengers Passengers Passengers Passengers Passengers Employees Employees Employees mployees Total Total Total Total Total Total caused by rolling stock Derailments of trains Accidents to persons Fires in rolling stock Collisions of trains Accident types Other accidents Level crossing SK02 LK02 UK02 OK02 K03 UK03 K04 7K04 SK04 LK04 JK04 %03 8K03

Table 3C - 2008 - Fatalities by type of accident and person category

45

2 0 18 28 12 68 0 20 23 0. 22 62 20 Table 4A - 2006 - Serious injuries by type of accident and person category ш 8 Ш X BG 띪 P. 22 7 A 9 56 26 88 Victim types – fatalities Unauthorised persons Unauthorised persons Unauthorised persons Unauthorised persons Unauthorised persons Unauthorised persons Level crossing users Other persons Other persons Other persons Other persons Other persons Other persons Passengers Passengers Passengers Passengers Passengers Employees Employees Employees Total Total Total Total Total Total caused by rolling stock Derailments of trains Accidents to persons Fires in rolling stock Collisions of trains Other accidents Accident types 1503 SS03 SS03 US03 0503 1504 1504 1504 1504 10504 SS02 SS02 LS02 US02 OS02

46

0 0 ~ 2 0 46 41 28 30 90 7 0 17 23 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 5 9 0 0 98 0 0 2 1 20 0 0 4 0 0 0 16 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 35 0 0 29 22 0 82 0 0 4 0 0 0 9 0 24 ш 22 0 0 1 ш 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 X Б BG E 0 8 닒 74 7 22 Η Victim types – fatalities Unauthorised persons Unauthorised persons Jnauthorised persons Unauthorised persons Unauthorised persons Jnauthorised persons Level crossing users Other persons Other persons Other persons Other persons Other persons Other persons Passengers Passengers Passengers Passengers Passengers Employees Employees Employees Total Total Total Total Total Total caused by rolling stock Derailments of trains Accidents to persons Fires in rolling stock Collisions of trains Other accidents Accident types Level crossing PS04 SS04 LS04 US04 OS04 1503 TS04 PS05 SS05 PS02 SS02 IS02 US02 OS02 SS03 SS03 US03 US03

Table 4B - 2007 - Serious injuries by type of accident and person category

47

Table 4C - 2008 - Serious injuries by type of accident and person category

ם כו		200	عدانوم الأواليدة مرادي		1/2 /2	5	;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;		<u>L</u>		- 6																[
₽	Accident types	Victim types – fatalities	AT	38	BG	D	Ŋ	H	ă	出		ES	H			=	5	3		0)	닙		RO				Total
TS01	Collisions of trains	Total	0	15	2	0	30	28	0	0		0				0	0			0	9		0				66
PS01		Passengers	0	10	0	0	28	21	0	0	0	0	0 0			0	0			0	6		0		4		69
SSO1		Employees	0	4	0	0	-	22	0	0		0				0	0			0			0				20
ISOI		Level crossing users	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0				0	0			0	0		0				0
USO		Unauthorised persons	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0		0	0 0	0	0	0	0		0 0	0	0		0		0	1 0	9
0201		Other persons	0	-	0	0	-	2	0	0	0	0				0	0			0	0		0				4
1502	Derailments of trains	Total	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0		-				0	0			0	0		4				15
PS02		Passengers	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0				0	0			0	0	4	3	0			12
2022	I	Employees	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	0	-	0 0	0		0	0		0 0	0	0	0	_	0		0 0	m
1502		Level crossing users	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0				0	0			0	0	0	0	0			0
NS02		Unauthorised persons	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0			0	0	0			0	0	0	0	0			0
0203		Other persons	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0				0	0			0	0	0	0	0	0		0
1503	Level crossing	Total	23	78	7	0	43	35	e	0	16	2	2 14			80	4		7 6		104	10	78				449
PS03	accidents	Passengers	0	22	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0		0	0	0				2	0	0		44		23
2203		Employees	0	0	-	0	-	e	-	0		0	1 0			0	0				0	0	0				13
1503		Level crossing users	23	*	9	0	42	32	2	0		2	1 14		0	80	4				102		29	-	-		380
US03		Unauthorised persons	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0 0		0	0	0				0		4		14	0 0	18
0203		Other persons	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0 0		0	0	0				0		15	0	0		16
TS04	Accidents to persons	Total	15	12	21	-	99	98	2	2	6	16	2 18	40	-	30	6		24 0		105	_	145		10 2	20 15	989
PS04	caused by rolling stock	ck Passengers	2	12	3	-	12	6	co	0		3	0 13	24	0	2	0			1	0		18				123
SS04		Employees	4	-	-	0	2	19	0	0		0	0 0		0	4	-			0	0		2		~	0 4	47
1504		Level crossing users	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0 0	0	0	0	0		0 0	0	0		65	0	_	0 0	92
US04		Unauthorised persons	6	2	17	0	25	37	2	2		13	2 4		0	21	8				105		41	_	9	14 6	401
0S04		Other persons	0	0	0	0	0	21	0	0	0	0	0 1		-	0	0				0		16	0			20
1505	Fires in rolling stock	Total	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0		0			0	0	0				0		0	0	0	0 0	2
PS05		Passengers	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0		0	0 0			0	0				0		0	0	0	0 0	2
SS05		Employees	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0 0	0	0	0	0		0 0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0
1505		Level crossing users	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	,	0	0 0		0	0	0		0 0	0	0	0	0	0	,	0 0	0
US05		Unauthorised persons	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0 0		0	0	0		0 0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 0	0
0205		Other persons	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 0		0	0	0		0 0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0
1506	Other accidents	Total	15	22	0	0	0	9	-	0		0	0 42			0	0		0 0	0	62	2	9	-	4		165
PS06		Passengers	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 0			0	0		0 0	0	39	0	2	0	2	0 0	20
9055		Employees	80	23	0	0	0	2	-	0	0	0	0 2		0	0	0		0 0	0	2	2	_	_	2	0	48
1506		Level crossing users	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	,	0				0	0			0	11	0	0	0		0 0	13
9050		Unauthorised persons	3	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0 2		0	0	0			0	9	0	0	0	0	0 0	12
9050		Other persons	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	0	0		0 0	0	4	0	0	0			2

Table 5 — Total and relative number of suicides

Total	1885	2 630	2 430	13.594	15.516	14.046	4 142.266	4 237.070	4 260.809
Ä	227	197	203	0.424	0.366	0.370	535.757	538.104	548
X	49	48	28	0.961	0.941	1.176	50.978	51.003	49.332
S	9	14	20	0.316	0.731	0.995	18.98	19.16	20.098
SE	69	78	71	0.522	0.581	0.514	132.295	134.345	138.194
&	16	24	29	0.169	0.249	0.302	94.9	96.262	96.145
PT	40	52	20	1.019	1.269	1.197	39.264	40.98	41.76
PL	25	28	29	0.113	0.126	0.129	221.737	223.031	224.359
NO	#	8	7	0.232	0.169	0.149	47.392	47.392	46.841
N	190	193	164	1.429	1.379	1.180	133	140	139
ΙN	9	10	6	0320	0.538	0.461	17.122	18.578	19.525
3									
5	0	0	0	0	0	0	13.827	14.992	15.817
⊨	126	138	137	0.334	0.373	0.373	377	370	366.863
ш	7	2	7	0.384	0.297	0.424	18.242	16.832	16.494
로	128	111	111	1.199	0.974	1.018	106.787	114	109
Œ	351	344	289	0.691	0.650	0.534	208	529.54	541
Ξ	42	54	52	0.825	1.027	0.976	50.9	52.577	53.259
S	189	188	174	0.897	0.867	0.812	210.757	216.873	214.349
ᆸ	-	4	-	0.052	0.201	0.047	19.071	19.905	21.164
##		0	-		0	0.138		12.056	7.234
ă	21	32	24	0.261	0.407	0.293	80.541	78.7	82
3G		90/	714		0.673	0.684	1.013.5	1 048.7	1 043.5
Z	174	150	160	1.094	0.981	0.914	158.999	152.89	174.961
Б		0	0		0	0		6.533	5.54
BG	32	39	27	0.887	1.082	0.770	36.09	36.03	35.075
岩	97	94		0.924	0.907	•	104.937	103.587	92.9
AT	78	113	93	0.513	0.729	0.587	152.19	155	158.4
Years	2006	2002	2008	2006	2002	2008	2006	2002	2008
Category	Total number of	suicides		Relative to train km.	number of suicides		Train km		
۵	N07			N17			R01		
	_=		_			_			_

Table 6 — Number of accidents by type of accidents

,				_									_											-	
	Total	673	317	300	499	366	333	1355	1295	1124	2 017	1640	1 710	257	122	105	1962	259	322	6763	3 999	3894	4 142.266	4 237.070	4 260.809
	¥	4	12	7	22	20	41	6	14	24	49	61	28	0	3	0	-	0	2	82	110	105	535.757	538.104	548
	X	7	14	12	00	Ε	9	88	71	63	23	63	78	80	22	80	22	14	20	199	222	217	50.978	51.003	49.332
	IS		2	-	m	22	0	14	32	15	23	19	14	-	0	0	2	2	9	0/	63	36	18.98	19.16	20.098
	SE	3	-	4	22	=	4-1	16	14	9	17	20	13	3	4	3	7	9	9	51	99	46	132.295	134.345	138.194
	8	2	99	35	22	20	15	130	189	201	295	211	310	8	15	17	35	34	10	495	534	288	94.9	96.262	96.145
	Ы	က	3	0	6	m	e	22	27	20	22	299	49	•	0	0	,	4	-	88	93	73	39.264	40.98	41.76
	님	13	9	80	126	132	105	275	325	278	423	418	397	2	7	6	98	88	95	928	976	888	221.737	223.031	224.359
	N0	2	4	9	3	0	e	2	2	0	2	2	2	~	-	e	-	m	0	16	12	14	47.392	47.392	46.841
	N	4	4	2	2	0	-	12	26	21	6	3	-	-	0	0	0	0	-	28	33	26	133 47	140 47	139 46
	21	0	0	-	-	0	0	10	9 2	10	52	37	45	0	0	0	0	2	2	63	51 3	61 2	17.122 13	18.578	19.525 13
	B1																						_		_
	5	-	9	-	7	27	-	21	13	19	37	36	42	0	-	22	0	0	0	99	83	89	13.827	14.992	15.817
	⊨	2	4	2	11	10	10	38	23	16	88	82	83	22	22	2	22	co	co	152	130	116	377 133	370 142	366.863 15.
	ш	-	0	0	0	0	-	0	2	-	0	2	e	0	0	0	-	-	0	2	22	-CO	18.242	16.832	16.494 366
	로	4	22	-	16	7	-	104	54	44	244	92	79	-	e	0	40	-	30	409	162	155	106.787	114 1	109
	Œ	48	82	97	42	89	97	140	115	115	74	77	22	62	37	24	99	31	æ	431	413	453	208	529.54	541
	Ξ	0	0	0	0	0	-	6	Ε	6	23	6	14	17	-	0	e	0	e	52	21	27	50.9	52.577	53.259
	S	0	0	4	6	12	15	13	19	18	51	æ	43	0	0	0	4	4	0	77	86	88	210.757	216.873	214.349
	H	4	3	-	4	80	2	25	22	17	32	30	19	2	0	-	0	0	0	0/	23	94	19.071	19.905	21.164
	出		0	0		-	2		33	12		14	12		-	0		0	0		49	26		12.056	7.234
	ă	-	-	0	0	-	0	-	-00	ro.	18	0,	13	-	0	0	4	4	2	32	24	23	80.541	78.7	82
	DE	422	15	13	52	9	12	181	97	76	216	184	193	98		9	14	14	29	983	319	329	1 013.5	1048.7	1043.5
	Z	13	3	22	10	m	2	104	48	53	104	29	72	0	-	1	2	-	0	233	115	133	158.999	152.89	174.961
•	D		0	0		0	0		0	0		0	-		0	-		0	0		0	2		6.533	5.54
	BG	44	3	co	139	-	0	31	10	6	72	42	52	23	0	-	1630	0	0	1939	26	65	36.09	36.03	35.075
	BE	84	77	96	7	17	21	99	76	99	22	90	25	18	17	24	0	0	0	187	217	220	104.937	103.587	92.9
	AT	2	4	e	-	3	7	40	22	36	22	27	35	1	-	0	7	14	16	106	104	97	152.19	155	158.4
	Years	2006	2002	2008	2006	2007	2008	2006	2002	2008	2006	2002	2008	2006	2002	2008	2006	2002	2008	3006	2002	2008	3006	2002	2008
	Accident types	Collisions of trains			Derailments of trains			sing	accidents			caused by rolling stock		Fires in rolling stock			Other accidents			berof	accidents		Number of train km		
	0	NO1			N02			NO3			N04			NOS			90N			N00			R01		

Table 7 — Number of precursors to accidents

Mathematical Mat	Total	5 804	5 813	2 699	7 803	3 820	835	3 820	3.757	4 178	2 823	7364	5 804	242	170	06	78	103	104	4 142.266	4 237.070	4 700 000
Mathematic barrowner bar	¥	232	192	170	98	22	16	617	220	106	352	324	316	0	0	0	0	0	0	535.757	538.104	0.40
Fine control broader Fine control broader	X	-	ro.	10	-	2	0	4	9	2	78	79	7.5		-	0		0	0			40.00
Protectione burnering Prot	IS	76	57	79	26	=	16		0	163	147	154	LO.	•	0	0	-	0	0			00000
Manufaction but which the control but which which the control but which the control bu	SE	256	187	218	80	102	87	80	9	12	194	217	275	8	2	-	10	3	-	132.295	134.345	100 101
Market baredone Market bar	&	349	319	380	0	m	0	2 335	2 456	2 557	425	425	396	-	2	0	2	2	2	94.9	96.262	74100
Protections beaced the continuence of the continu	PI	45	39	33	98	40	37		0	0	24	20	24	-	0	0	c	1	0	39.264	40.98	AL 30
Protestation in the content of the	l l	3 054	2 484	2 396	88	17	19	•	0	52		4013	2 653	137	99	22	က	22	29	221.737	223.031	010 100
Protectionals	ON	51	10	36	96	14	17	0	0	-	78	73	70	52	39	9	0	0	2	47.392	47.392	40.044
Procession to accorded by September Procession to accorded by Sept	¥	34	31	31	143	13	-		-	18	292	275	240	0	0	0	0	0	-	133	140	001
Broken axides Animeted frame Animeted Broken axides Animeted frame Animeted Animeted <th< td=""><td>2</td><td>-</td><td>2</td><td>4</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>co</td><td>e</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>4</td><td>2</td><td>-C</td><td>-C2</td><td>6</td><td>2</td><td>2</td><td>-</td><td>0</td><td>17.122</td><td>18.578</td><td>10.101</td></th<>	2	-	2	4	-	-	co	e	0	0	4	2	-C	-C2	6	2	2	-	0	17.122	18.578	10.101
Procurous to accidentials Procurous to accidential to acc																						H
Procusors to accidents Years	-	-	62	1	2	40	0	4	245	39	124	09	3	0	0	-	22	28	0	13.827	14.992	15 0 1 2
Procurons to accidents Reads Alica Reads Cir Cir	⊨	361	430	84	6743	3 113	41	4	0	2	24	15	20	1	0	0	0	-	-	377	370	000000
Procurous to accidents Realize	ш	8	-	co	S	-	0	4	-	2	35	31	22	0	0	0	0	0	-	18.242	16.832	10.404
Procursors to accidents Pease Pe	呈	768	654	716	co	47	-		0	-	80	12	-	-	0	0	co	-	0	106.787	114	100
Previsions to accidents Years	Œ	11	323	306	171	177	194	290	27.7	27.7	35	112	124		2	0		0	-	208	529.54	14.7
Preuzons to accidents Years AT 115 AT AT AT AT AT AT AT A	Ξ	99	21	19	10	7	co	'	'	2	18	22	30	14	'	0	0	'	0	50.9	52.577	0 0 0
Precusors to accidents Pears Pea	S	74	54	22	186	171	218	9	2	9	93	93	111	-	0	0	0	0	0	210.757	216.873	014.040
Preutsors to accidents Pears Pea	표	'	269	223	'	'	110	0	0	0	-	_	-		-	-		0	0	19.071	19.905	01 104
Preuzons to accidents Years AT 115 R B CT C2 D D	ш		7	7		0	0		0	0		2	2		0	0		0	0		12.056	1004
Preuzons to accidents Years AT 115 R BG CT CZ	ă	0	32	14	-	9	-	544	193	119	756	299	510	19	22	7	23	80	6	80.541	78.7	c
Precursors to accidents Pears AT 115 T T T T T T T T T	DE	124	407	536	72	88	40	0	0	0		727	760	2	9	-	6	4	6	1 013.5		10401
Precusors to accidents Pears Pears Pears	Z	0	21	4	-	0	0	0	0	0	09	26	26	0	0	0	0	0	0	158.999	152.89	174001
Previsors to accidents Years AT 115 8E	D		13	80		0	0		0	0		2	8		0	0		0	0		6.533	-
Precusors to accidents Years AT	BG	7	92	29		25	90		0,	13	2	15	12		17	13		29	7	36.09	36.03	20.00
Precusors to accidents Years ATT	38	115	88	281	-	0	0	-	-	-	33	18	65	0	-	-	0	0	0	104.937	103.587	000
Precusors to accidents Broker rails Track bucktes Wong-side signaling failures Signals passed at danger Broker axles Broker axles	TA	171	•			'	'		7	3	15	12	16		2	0		3	3	152.19	155	70.0
Precusors to accidents Broker rails Track bucktes Wong-side signaling failures Signals passed at danger Broker axles Broker axles	ars	900	200	800	900	700	800	900	200	900	900	200	800	900	200	800	900	200	800	900	700	0000
	ursors to accidents Ye		32	20		30	28			20	lassed at		20		30	20		30	20		X	LS
		101 Brok			102 Track			IO3 Wror	failin		lO4 Signa	dan		l05 Brok			106 Brok			R01 Num		

Table 8 — Costs of all accidents

۵	Category	Years	AT	38	B8	D	Z	핌	ă	出	EF	B	Œ	Œ	로	ш	ш	1	n n	N	NO	P	PT	SN NO	SE	IS	X	¥	Total
000	Costs of all accidents	2006	0	0 0	1 091 619		3 015 487.38	0	0		0	0 45366	366 103	0 18.	873 308 75	250 000	0 12.4	442	43 424	0	34 625 211.041	4 483 573.48	52 113 923.37	638 670	67 145 296.238	1944 225	1 160 000	120 266 703	334 529 985,779
		2007	0	0	674623	0	3 844 692	0 13	13 740 712	0 2	2 119 403	0 353	35 316 435	0	16.668 11	110 000	0 60 001.	89:	339 308.7	0	6 375 000	5 370 073.01	60 250 000	580 503.66	79 530 122.366	0	1990 000	189 681 101	399 981 992084
		2008	0	0	686371	130 000 000	10 079 369	0 2	23 601 892 179	179 74735 2	2 193 186	0 42.2	42 242 859	0	0 80	800 000	0 118 131.9	1.9	3 545 660.46	91 900	6 975 000	2 855 166.23	47 696 000	1 541 907.91	55 705 795,050	301 987	2 806 375	129 256 683	460 678 030.900
100	Costs of deaths	2006	_	Ů	-		945 110.87	•	•		•	- 422	42 270 504	-	33 654	-	-	0	0	'	0	•	47 240 000	112	35 775 161.290		750 000	80 643 600	207 658 142.160
		2007	_	Ċ	0 -	0	12 623	- 1;	12 017 760	0	•	- 345	34 569 918			•	•	0	1329		0	156 295.74	54 960 000	2 125	43 306 774.194	0	0	129925800	274 952 624.894
		2008	'	Ė	- 16 352.65	0	522 252	- 2	21814744	0	•	- 40.7	40 734 897			•	-	0	11 186	40 200	0	14 957.65	40 540 000	1081	31 201 397.849		0	114 448 875	249 345 943.629
000	Costs of injuries	2006					474 372.95					- 30	3 095 599		526			0	951		31 657		3 934 062	0	8 724 086.022		387 000	5 600 250	22 248 537.232
		2007	_		- 2 523	0	6 2 0 8	-	1 722 952	0		- 7	746 517					0	0		275 000	24 639.24	4310 000		7 412 473.118	0	0	6 944 310	21 444 622.358
		2008	<u>'</u>	Ĺ	0 -	0	99 249	-	1 787 148	0	•	- 15	507 962	-		-	_	0	740	3 100	275 000	63 193.06	5 030 000	•	2 675 483.871		0	4 073 604	15 515 479.821
003	Costs of replacement	2006		Ė	1 091 619		1 596 003.56							- 18	1838231 75	750 000	- 12 442	142	40 037		16 389 474.041	4 483 573.48		629 858	21 078 726.56	1944 225	20 000	16 071 468	65 945 657.55
	or repair of damaged RS and railway	2007	_	Ė	- 572 084	0	3 724 791			0 1	1 933 255				16.668 11	110 000	- 60 001.	89.	335 235.13		3 000 000	5 095 911.57		317 137.22	24 775 842.796	0	1890 000	44 406 218	86 220 493.064
	installations	2008	<u>'</u>	Ĺ	- 634 360.86	60 000 000 GB	9 410 339		- 4	146 101.85	618 441	•	·	<u> </u>	- 8	800 000	- 118 131.9	1.9	3 340 838.84	24 300	3 600 000	26 71815	750 000	1 490 181.93	19 725 074.62	301 987	2 639 224	6 228 951	112 499 747
004	Costs of delays etc.	2006		Ĺ											864			0	2436	'	18 204 080		939 861.37	8 700	1 567 322.366		3 000	17 951 385	38 677 648.836
		2007	<u>'</u>	Ĺ	100 016	0	101 070	-	-	0	186 148	•	•	-		-	_	0	2745	'	3 100 000	93 226.46	980 000	261 241.44	4 035 032.258	0	100 000	8 404 773	17 364 251.768
		2008		Ĺ	35 657.49 70 000 000	70 000 000 07	47 529		- 3	33 645.5	1 574 745					•		0	192 895.25	24 300	3 100 000	105 200.52	1376 000	50 644.98	21 03 838.710		167 151	4 505 253	83 316 860.450
P04	Number of train km	2006	152.19	104.937	36.09		158.999	1 013.5	80.541		19.071 210	210.757	50.9	108	106.787	18.242	377 13.827	127	17	133	47.392	221.737	39.264	94.9	132.295	18.98	50.978	535.757	4 142.266
		2007	155	103.587	36.03	6.533	152.89	1048.7	78.7	12.056	19.905 216	216.873	52.577 52	529.54	114	16.832	370 14.992	192	19	140	47.392	223.031	40.98	96.262	134.345	19.16	51.003	538.104	4 237.070
		2008	158.4	92.9	35.075	5.54	174.961	1043.5	82	7.234	21.164 214	214.349	53.259	541	109	16.494 36	366.863 15.817	417	20	139	46.841	224.359	41.76	96.145	138.194	20.098	49.332	548	4 260.809

Table 9 — Hours lost due to accidents

	Total	149 403.7	91 920.07	163 341.046	90000	0.002	0.007	345 395 586.348	159 693 138.935	165 697 138.168
ŀ	M	33 470	21 349	38 115	0	0000	0000	18 4127 400 34	188 624 18	235 796 16
ŀ	SK	•	0	0	•	•		- 18	0	0
-	IS	•	0			0	'	16 857	16 668	16 788
ŀ	SE	2 299	7 124	1 794	0	0	0.000	15 163 144	27 486 739	36 070 744
ŀ	RO	233	1 185	723	1	00000	0000	•	117 578.368	75 839.829
	Ы	•	•			•		16 239	15 812	16 006
	PL	3 962	25 635.72	16 625		0.000	0.000	•	87 751.3	94 464.212
	NO	4 647.5	9 283	1148	0.000	0.001	0.000	119 890	12 597.795	13 215.047
	Z	1	1		1	,	'	1		
	U [V	0	0	2 400	0	0	0.000	24 181	22 010	20 947
-	II III	1.2	75	03	00000	0000	00000	48	448	28
		441.2	8 149.75	160.03				18 689.348	18 4	18 828
	IE II	- 9039	- 12164.6	- 2572.016	0 -	- 0	0 -	- 145 790 322	- 131 620 554	- 128 888 73127
		_	_		_					
	H					·	'	837		36 656
	Œ		'			'		'		
	H									
ľ	S	•	•		-	•		•		'
	E	95312	5 840	95 104	900'0	0.000	0.007	16 027	15 134	14 608
	H		0	200					0	0
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-	DE	1			1		'			
-	Z	1	1 189	4 500	,	0.000	0.000	102 000	87 822.437	91 000
ŀ	C		0	0		0	0		3 400.235	3 514.81
-	BG	•	•	•	,	•	,	•	- 34	
f	BE	•	•			•	'	•		
	AT	'	'	'	'	'	'	'	'	
	Years	2006	2007	2008	2006	2007	2008	2006	2007	2008
	Category	Total number of	hours lost		Number of hours	lost relative to total	hours	Total number of	working hours	
ĺ	Q	. 00M			W10			R04		
Ì										

Table 10 — Technical safety of infrastructure and its implementation

٥	Category	Years		AT	BE E	BG (CI.	Z	DE	X		E	ES	H	모	ш	⊨		≘	Λ	N	N0	П	PT	B0	SE	S	SK	¥	
T01	Perc. of track with ATP	2006		- 0.081		0.15		0.16	- 0	0.28		0.957	7 0.72	2 0.558	0.340	0.05	0.572	0.25		0.325	86.0	0.7	0	0.503	0.488	907.0	0.64	0.151	0.043	
.=	in operation	2002		- 0.084		0.14	-	0.17	0.881 0.	0.53 0.	0.24	0 0.975	5 0.749	9 0.585	ľ	0.05	6.0	0.250		0.436	0.99	0.7	0	0.508	0.500	0.656	0.545	0.151	0.042	
		2008	0.6	0.664 0.069		0.11	-	0.002	0.9 0.	0.53 0.232	32	0.980	0.77	7 0.595		0.05	0.915	0.250		0.387	0.99	0.74	0	0.513	0.525	0.72	0.67	0.185	0.042	
T02 Pe	Perc. of train km using 2006	2006		- 0	0.06	90:0		•	-			0.96		- 6:0	0.780	0.12	0.490	0.641		-	0.999	6:0	0	0.9	•	'	•	0.418	0.030	
0	operational ATP	2002		_	,	0.2	-	,	,	- 0	0.95	0.97	7 0.97	7 0.791	'	0.137	0.625	809'0		,	0.999	6:0	0	6.0	•	0.932		0	0.030	
		2008		- 0.039		0.21	-			- 0.684		0	- 0.98	- 8	'	0.133	0.717	0.589		-	0.999	6.0	0	6.0		96'0		0	0.030	
T03 Tc	Total number of level	2006	2/6 9	377 2 037		820		8 576 20	20 317 15	1 548	1270	70 2 885	5 4430	16 804	5 981	1.171	8 383	436		657 2	2 724	4300	17 011	1 297	5 534	10 541	3962	2 322	7 211	
U	crossings	2002	6.7	6 776 2 180		820	0	8 628 19	19 011 14	1 449 3	328 1 265	35 2.811	4334	14 651	5 972	1 126	7 350	531		660 2	2 720	3 761	14219	1 266	5 625	10 572	944	2 3 0 7	7 456	
		2008	67	6713 2 110		821	0	8 551 18	18 051 15	1 563 3	329 1 265	35 2 699	9 4 218	8 14 640	5 910	1 095	7 643	523		641 2	2 700	3 987	14 255	1 229	5 784	11 352	929	2 265	089 9	125 983
TO4 Tc	Tot number of level	2006	0.8	0.880 0.328	28 0.160	09		0.737 0	0.391 0.4	0.432	0.424	24 0.168	8 0.502	2 0.545	0.747	0.555	0.462	0.199		0.161 0	0.419	1.052	0.598	0.369	0.271	0.686	0.619	0.496	0.228	
U	crossings per line km	2002	0.831	331 0.351	51 0.160	09	0	0.747 0	0.366 0.3	0.390 0.149	49 0.413	13 0.157	7 0.492	2 0.489	0.565	0.534	0.404	0.243		0.152 0	0.406	0.922	0.499	0.359	0.276	0.696	0.430	0.636	0.237	
		2008	0.8	0.819 0.336	36 0.160	09	0	0.740 0	0.348 0.4	0.411 0.154	54 0.413	13 0.150	0.477	7 0.497	0.559	0.519	0.297	0.240		0.135 0	0.403	0.977	0.497	0.348	0.284	0.706	0.615	0.625	0.214	
T05 Pe	ings	2006	0.	0.29 0.792		0.42		0.412	0.54		0.61	51 0.350	0.19	9 0.74	0.615	0.17	0.753	0.764		0.64 0	0.677	-	0.39	0.393	0.303	0.344	0.34	0.470	0.234	
> E	with automatic or	2002	0.2	0.283 0.808		0.42		0.247	0.57 0.	0.57 0.	0.47 0.656	56 0.353	3 0.194	4	0.59	0.193	0.822	0.744		0.64 0	0.675	-	0.337	0.382	0.305	0.329	0.35	0.470	0.241	
-		2008	0.2	0.286 0.	0.81 0.	0.57		0.247	0.59 0.	0.55 0.	0.49 0.7	0.72 0.353	3 0.201	1 0.727	0.59	0.2	0.835	0.75		0.6	0.763	-	0.337	0.373	0.294	0.31	0.33	0.487	0.246	
R03 N	Number of track km	2006	7.9	7 924 6 212	12 5 119	119	#	11 641.5 51	51 959 3.5	3 586	2 997	17 159.9	.9 8830	0 30 860	8 007.49	2 110	18 154	2 187.4		4 091.4 6	200	4 0 8 7	28 445.8	3 512.7 2	20 384.809	15 360	1 559	4 678	31 594	296 959.999
		2002	8 154	154 6.215		5 119 11	11 651	11 553.8 51	51959 3.7.	3720 2200	3 060	30 17 885.3	3 8 816	6 29 973	10 577	2 110	18 194.72	2 180.9	4	352.55 6	002 9	4 080	28 499.22	3 527.7 2	20 384.809	15 198	2 193	3 629	31 473	301 913.999
		2008	8 197	197 6 282		5 116 15	150 11	11 552 0 51	E1 0E1 2 0	2 000	0000	17 000	0000	00 430		0110	00 000	0 0 1 10					0 0 0 0 0						_	

Table 11 — Management of safety — number of audits planned and conducted

El ES H H II LI LI IV NI NO PI PI PO SE SI SS SS <th></th> <th>Total</th> <th>9</th> <th>97</th> <th>41</th> <th>42</th> <th>86</th> <th>97</th>		Total	9	97	41	42	86	97
Chegony Kears AI ER C 773 44 1 1 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I		OT.	6.2	91	7.3	13.9	16.1	18.6
Category Kears AI ER C 773 44 1 1 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I		¥	720	189	47	0.932	0.976	1.02
Category Kears AI E BG CT CZ DE DT F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F		SK	9	0	-	•	0	-
Category Kears AI BE BG CT CZ DE DT AI B TI LI		IS		'	4	•	•	-
Category Years AT RE R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R		SE	319	188	156	0.982	0.969	0.881
Quegony Years AT RE BG CT CZ DR RE R AT R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R					1	-	1	'
Category Years AT BE CT CZ DE DX EE EI EA AT		PT	2	9	1	1	1	1
Category Years AT BE CT CZ DE DX EE EI EA H H IE TT LT		П	0	0	0	1	0	0
Category Years Ari BE CT CZ DE DR EE R R H R H R H R H R H II II </td <th></th> <td>ON</td> <td>99</td> <td>99</td> <td>72</td> <td>0.7</td> <td>0.74</td> <td>0.95</td>		ON	99	99	72	0.7	0.74	0.95
Category Years Ari BE BG CT CZ DE DT FB					20		_	_
Category Years Ari BE BG CT CZ DE DR EF FF			131	1853	265	1.19	0.975	1.15
Category Years AT BE BG CT CZ DE DT FB FB FB TT			_	7	6	_	1	_
Category Years Art BE BG CT CZ DF DR EF R R H R H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H								
Category Nears AT RE BG CT CZ DE DK EE EB FT FT HU Trian number of a complished audits 2008 1'09 0 31'16 2'4 2'1 1'18 1'19 1'18 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19 1'19			_				0.563	
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Category Years AT BE BG CT CZ DE DK EE Total number of accomplished audits 2006 - 0 2719 159 - 33 249 Accomplished audits 2008 109 0 3196 24 263 - 32 83 Accomplished audits 2006 - 0 - 1 - 138 - a pretriated parted 2007 - - 0 - 1 - 1 - 1 a contraction of parted audits 2008 0 - 0 - 0 - 1 - 138 -	5							
Category Years AT BE BG CT CZ DE DK EE Total number of accomplished audits 2006 - 0 2719 159 - 33 249 Accomplished audits 2008 109 0 3196 24 263 - 32 83 Accomplished audits 2006 - 0 - 1 - 138 - a pretriated parted 2007 - - 0 - 1 - 1 - 1 audits 2008 0 - 0.55 1.1 - 1.37 0								_
D Calegory Years AT BE BG CT CZ DE DK E							_	**
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Comments on CSI data tables

ERA has reviewed the reported CSI data and all large fluctuations has been checked by the reporting NSA. In the table below are given comments for the data where for example fluctuations are due to changes in reporting procedures or where the national definition applied gives a value that deviates from European average

Table	Country	Year	Variable	Comment
Table 3C	72	2008	PK01	The high number of passengers seriously injured and killed in 2008 is due to one serious accident, a bridge collapse and subsequent high speed train collision (8 August 2008).
Table 4A	出	2006	PS03	One significant level crossing accident in 2006 explaining the large number of passengers seriously injured.
Table 4B	BE	2007	PS03	The figure includes suicides. It has not been possible to correct the figure.
	BE	2007	90SS	The figure includes work accidents.
Table 4C	DE	2008	PS01	The large number of passenger seriously injured is mainly due to one big accident.
	72	2008	PS01	The high number of passengers seriously injured and killed in 2008 is due to one serious accident, a bridge collapse and subsequent high speed train collision (8 August 2008).
Table 6	BG	2006	N01-N06	The variable includes non-significant accidents.
	DE	2006	N01-N06	Data include non-significant accidents.
	Ш	2006	N04-N05	Data include non-significant accidents.
	Æ	2006	N01-N02	Does not include collisions/derailments on sidings.
	유	2006-2008	N01-N06	The fluctuation in number of occurrences between 2006 and 2008 is due to a combination of change in reporting procedures and true change in number of events.
	RO	2006	NO1	The variable does not include collisions with objects.
	RO	2006	NO5	Does not include fires intentionally caused to sabotage.
	RO	2006-07	NO2	The variable only considers derailments of trains, as trains with planned movements. Derailments with isolated locomotives are excluded.
Table 7	BG	2006	101	Only includes broken rails that gave more than 30 min delay of traffic.
	DE	2006	101	Only includes broken rails with a subsequent dangerous situation.
	DE	2008	101	The large nr of broken rails was due to a severe winter.
	DK	2006	103	National definition: All events when the signal changes unexpectantly, also to a more restrictive is registered.

Table	Country	Year	Variable	Comment
Table 7	DK	2006	104	National definition: All events when a restrictive signal is passed is registered, also when there is no real danger and in many cases just by a few meters.
	田	2006	101	There was a change in reporting procedures between 2006 and 2007. Using 2007 reporting procedures, the figure would have been 346.
	Æ	2006	104	There was a change in reporting procedures between 2006 and 2007. Using 2007 reporting procedures, the figure would have been 110.
	⊢	2008	101	There has been a change in reporting procedures between 2007 and 2008.
	⊨	2006-2008	102	There has been a change in reporting procedures between 2006 and 2008.
	디	2006-07	101-104	Fluctuation in reported nr of occurrences is the effect of a change in definition.
	٦	2006	101	The large reported number of track buckles is confirmed. 2006 was a hot summer causing a lot of track buckles.
	ON N	2006-07	101-102	Varying weather conditions caused large fluctuations in this variable between 2006 and 2007.
	ON N	2008	101, 105	The change in reported nr of events is due to an improved implementation of existing reporting procedures.
	占	2006	103, 104	The infrastructure manager did not collect information on incidents and near misses before 2007. The information is therefore incomplete. SPADs were not collected.
	PL	2006-2008	103-106	There has been a change in reporting procedures explaning the fluctuation in reported nr of events.
	RO	2006-2008	103	The variable includes all signalling failures.
Table 8	>	2008	C01-C04	The large numbers are explained by a small number of serious accidents and improved reporting and data collection procedures.
Table 9	RO	2008	R04	The change in reported nr of working hours is due to a change in definitions and reporting procedures.
	¥	2007	R04	The change in reported nr of working hours is due to a change in reporting procedures.
Table 10	BE	2006-07	R03	The figure is taken from Eurostat 2005 data.
	DE	2006	R03	The figure given is per 31 December 2007.
	П	2008	R03	The increase in network length is due to a change in reporting from line km to track km.
	PL	2006-07	RO3	The figure is excluding crossovers on main lines and is taken from Eurostat 2005 data.
Table 11	2	2006	A01	The figure only includes audits conducted by State Railway Technical Inspectorate.
	2	2007	A01	The figure includes audits conducted by IM, RU and State Railway Technical Inspectorate.
	X	2008	A01	The change in reported nr of audits is due to a change in interpretation of the definition.

Annex 2 – Serious accidents with five or more fatalities since 1990

Date	Country	Place	Туре	Fatalities	Injuries
1990-02-02	DE	Rüsselsheim station	Train collision	17	37
1990-03-22	DE	Gröbers, Halle	Train collision	5	0
1990-04-16	NO	Between Skoeyen and Lysaker	Train collision	2	0
1990-06-23	PL	Suburb of Wroclaw	Level crossing accident	7	0
1990-07-03	ES	Unknown	Train collision	9	2
1990-08-21	PL	Wlochy	Train collision	16	42
1990-08-25	CZ	Spálov, Between Železný Brod and Tanvald stations	Train collision	10	16
1991-01-27	CZ	Chlumchany	Accident to person caused by RS in motion	2	_
1991-03-31	SK	Jesenske-Rimavska Sobota	Level crossing accident	9	0
1991-06-29	EL	Corinth	Level crossing accident	œ	0
1991-07-28	PT	Linha da Beira Alta — Monte Lobos/ Carregal do Sal	Level crossing accident	2	0
1991-10-12	DE	Cologne	Accident to person caused by RS in motion	9	—
1991-10-17	H	Melun Station, near Paris	Train collision	16	50
1992-01-07	HU	Between Vámosgyörk and Hort	Level crossing accident	2	8
1992-01-27	⊨	Ciampino, Near Rome	Train collision	9	0
1992-06-10	⊨	Caluso, Near Turin	Train collision	9	33
1992-08-03	SK	Budkovce — Drahnov	Train collision	9	0
1992-08-17	BG	Kazichene station	Train collision	8	57
1992-08-19	AT	Puchberg	Train collision	2	30
1992-09-26	Н	Agárd, Gárdony	Level crossing accident	16	0
1992-10-01	BG	Harmanli	Train collision	2	_
1992-10-18	PL	Chelmce	Level crossing accident	9	0
1992-11-15	DE	Northeim	Train derailment	11	0
1992-11-30	NL	Hoofddorp	Train derailment	5	9
1992-12-10	DE	Bad Oldesloe station	Accident to person caused by RS in motion	7	-

Date	Country	Place	Tvne	Fatalities	Inimies
1993-02-12	유	Between Bátaszék-Pörböly stations	Level crossing accident	10	12
1993-08-01	RO	Urleasca	Level crossing accident	12	0
1993-08-03	ES	Vega de Anzo, near Oviedo	Train collision	12	2
1993-08-14	H	Between Makó and Makó-Újváros station	Level crossing accident	9	0
1993-10-03	NO	Nordstrand, near Oslo	Train collision	9	9
1994-02-17	PT	Linha do Sul — Level crossing at pk 274.94 (São Marcos da Serra)	Level crossing accident	9	2
1994-03-21	СН	Between Daeniken and Schoenenwerd	Train collision with an obstacle	6	14
1994-04-30	PT	Linha do Oeste — Level crossing at pk 101.71	Level crossing accident	2	1
1994-05-29	PT	Linha da Póvoa — Level crossing at pk 39.91	Level crossing accident	5	8
1994-09-11	EL	Tithoréa	Train derailment	2	0
1994-09-29	DE	Bad Bramstedt	Train collision	7	15
1994-10-15	NK	Cowden, Kent	Train collision	2	0
1994-11-17	ES	Santa Fe/Gador	Level crossing accident	7	0
1994-12-02	HN	Szajol station	Train derailment	31	54
1995-02-27	ES	San Sebastian	Train derailment	5	33
1995-06-24	CZ	Krouna, Between Policka and Chrudim	Train collision	19	4
1995-06-27	HU	Between Györszabadhegy and Nyúl stations	Level crossing accident	9	7
1995-09-11	НП	Sorkifalud	Level crossing accident	5	2
1995-09-22	FR	Agde	Level crossing accident	2	0
1996-01-26	RO	Nr Tirgusor	Level crossing accident	12	0
1996-02-26	HU	Kutas	Level crossing accident	13	10
1996-03-03	RO	Gavojdia	Level crossing accident	9	6
1996-10-07	BE	Berlaar	Level crossing accident	5	0
1997-01-12	⊢	Piacenza	Train derailment	8	30
1997-03-31	ES	Uharte Arakil station, Pamplona, Navarra	Train derailment	18	40
1997-05-05	PL	Reptowo, Szczecin	Train derailment	12	40
1997-07-05	DE	Between Neustadt, Marburg and Stadtallendorf	Train collision with an obstacle	9	2

Date	Country	Place	Туре	Fatalities	Injuries
1997-09-08	FR	Saint-Antoine-de-Breuilh, Port-Sainte-Foy	Level crossing accident	13	18
1997-09-19	NK	Southall, London	Train collision	7	30
1998-03-06	Е	Jyväskylä	Train derailment	10	8
1998-05-27	H	Between Létavértes and Monostorpályi stations	Level crossing accident	5	0
1998-06-03	DE	Eschede	Train derailment	101	87
1998-09-19	NO	Gol station	Level crossing accident	5	0
1999-01-28	SK	Bratislava	Accident to person caused by RS in motion	9	0
1999-03-13	H	Between Tiszakécske and Lakitelek	Level crossing accident	5	1
1999-06-22	SE	Veka	Level crossing accident	2	0
1999-07-27	PL	Owadow, Radom	Level crossing accident	5	_
1999-10-05	Α̈́	Ladbroke Grove, Paddington, London	Train collision	31	227
2000-01-04	NO	Asta	Train collision	19	18
2000-02-06	DE	Brühl	Train derailment	6	52
2000-06-04	⊨	Near Parma	Train collision	5	_
2000-06-16	NL	Voorst	Level crossing accident	2	0
2001-01-03	ES	Aguilas/Lorca Sutulena	Level crossing accident	12	2
2001-02-28	Ϋ́	Selby, Great Heck, North Yorkshire	Train collision with an obstacle	10	82
2001-03-27	BE	Pecrot	Train collision	_∞	7
2002-02-20	RO	Tecuci	Level crossing accident	7	80
2002-02-26	AT	Wampersdorf	Train collision	9	17
2002-04-04	PT	Ramal da Lousã — pk 29.9	Train collision	2	4
2002-05-10	Ν	Potters Bar	Train derailment	7	32
2002-07-20	⊨	Messina, Sicily	Train derailment	_∞	2
2002-10-02	PT	Linha de Cascais — pk 0.69 (Lisboa)	Level crossing accident	9	0
2002-11-06	FR	Nancy	Fire in rolling stock	12	0
2002-12-02	PL	Malkinia	Level crossing accident	5	4
2003-02-02	H	Hesdin	Level crossing accident	2	0

Date	Country	Place	Туре	Fatalities Injuries	Injuries
2003-05-08	HU	Balatonszabadi-Sóstó, Siófok, Lake Balaton	Level crossing accident	33	7
2003-06-03	ES	Chinchilla/Navajuelos	Train collision	19	9
2003-06-11	DE	Between Schrozberg and Niederstetten, Baden-Württemberg	Train collision	9	25
2003-06-24	RO	Stroiesti	Level crossing accident	2	4
2004-05-07	ES	Hellin	Level crossing accident	5	0
2004-11-06	NK	Ufton Nervet	Level crossing accident	7	8
2004-12-09	CZ	Vrahovice	Level crossing accident	5	23
2005-01-07	⊢	Bolognina di'Crevalcore	Train collision	17	15
2005-02-12	BE	Diepenbeek	Level crossing accident	5	0
2006-05-26	SK	Between Drienovska Nova Ves and Licartovce	Level crossing accident	5	0
2006-08-21	ES	Between León and Palencia.	Train derailment	7	9
2006-10-11	Æ	Zoufftgen, between Bettembourg station and Thionville	Train collision	9	2
2007-07-22	RO	Tirgovista	Level crossing accident	8	0
2008-02-28	BG	Between the railway stations Kunino — Cherven Briyag	Fire in rolling stock	6	10
2008-06-02	Æ	Between Perrignier and Thonon Les Bains	Level crossing accident	7	3
2008-08-08	CZ	Studenka station	Train collision with an obstacle	7	22
2008-08-14	HU	Between Vamosgyork and Gyongyos stations	Level crossing accident	5	0
2009-02-21	SK	Polomka	Level crossing accident	12	20
2009-06-29	⊨	Viareggio	Train derailment	32	27
2009-08-14	RO	lasi	Level crossing accident	13	3
2009-09-01	PT	Baião	Level crossing accident	2	2
2010-02-15	BE	Buizingen station	Train collision	18	83 (*)

Table 3. Railway accidents in Europe with five or more fatalities 1990–2010. (*) The number of fatalities and injuries in the Halle accident as per 23 February 2010. Figures can change.

Annex 3 — List of national safety authorities and national investigation bodies

Country	National safety authority	National investigation body
Austria	Bundesministerium für Verkehr, Innovation und Technologie Oberste Eisenbahnbehörde http://www.bmvit.gv.at	Bundesanstalt für Verkehr (VERSA) Unfalluntersuchungstelle des Bundes, Fachbereich Schiene http://versa.bmvit.gv.at
Belgium	Federale Overheidsdienst Mobiliteit en Vervoer Directoraat-generaal vervoer te Land Service Public fédéral Mobilité et Transports Direction générale Transport terrestre http://www.mobilit.fgov.be	Federale Overheidsdienst Mobiliteit en Vervoer Onderzoeksorgaan voor Ongevallen en Incidenten op het Spoor Service Public fédéral Mobilité et Transports Organisme d'enquête sur les Accidents et les Incidents ferroviaires http://www.mobilit.fgov.be
Bulgaria	Ministry of Transport — Railway Administration Executive Agency http://www.iaja.government.bg	Ministry of Transport – Railway Accident Investigation Unit http://www.mtitc.government.bg/
Czech Republic	Drazni Urad — Rail Authority http://www.du-praha.cz http://www.ducr.cz	Drážní inspekce – Rail Safety Inspection office http://www.dicr.cz
Germany	Eisenbahn — Bundesamt (EBA) http://www.eba.bund.de	Bundesministerium für Verkehr, Bau und Stadtentwicklung Eisenbahn-Unfalluntersuchungsstelle http://www.bmvbs.de
Denmark	Trafikstyrelsen http://www.trafikstyrelsen.dk	Havarikommissonen for Civil Luftfart og Jernbane http://www.havarikommissionen.dk
Estonia	Estonian Technical Surveillance Authority http://www.tja.ee/?lang=en	Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications Emergency Management Department http://www.mkm.ee
Greece	Hellenic Ministry of Transport and Communications Safety Authority for Rail Transport http://www.yme.gr	Hellenic Ministry of Transport and Communications Committee for Accident Investigation http://www.yme.gr
Spain	Agencia de Seguridad del Transporte Terrestre http://www.fomento.es	Ministerio de Fomento Comision de Investigación de Accidentes ferroviarios http://www.fomento.es
Finland	Finnish Transport Safety Agency TraFi http://www.trafi.fi (See also: www.rautatievirasto.fi)	Accident Investigation Board of Finland http://www.onnettomuustutkinta.fi
France	Établissement Public de Sécurité Ferroviaire (EPSF) http://www.securite-ferroviaire.fr	Bureau d'Enquêtes sur les Accidents de Transport Terrestre http://www.bea-tt.equipement.gouv.fr
Hungary	National Transport Authority http://www.nkh.gov.hu	Transportation Safety Bureau http://www.kbsz.hu

Country	National safety authority	National investigation body
Ireland	Railway Safety Commission http://www.rsc.ie	Railway Accident Investigation Unit http://www.raiu.ie
Italy	Agenzia Nazionale per la Sicurezza delle Ferrovie http://www.mit.gov.it	Ministero delle Infrastrutture e dei Trasporti Railway Safety Commission http://www.infrastrutturetrasporti.it
Lithuania	Valstybinė geležinkelio inspekcija State Railway Inspectorate http://www.vgi.lt	Katastrofy tyrimu vadovas National Investigation Body http://www.transp.lt
Luxembourg	Ministère du Développement durable et des Infrastructures http://www.gouvernement.lu	Administration des Enquêtes Techniques http://www.mt.public.lu/transports/AET/
Latvia	State Railway Technical Inspectorate (SRTI) http://www.vdzti.gov.lv	Transport Accident and Incident Investigation Bureau (TAIIB) http://www.taiib.gov.lv
Netherlands	Inspectie Verkeer en Waterstaat http://www.ivw.nl	The Dutch Safety Board http://www.safetyboard.nl
Norway	Norwegian Railway Inspectorate http://www.sjt.no	Accident Investigation Board Norway http://www.aibn.no
Poland	Urzad Transportu Kolejowego http://www.utk.gov.pl	Panstwowa Komisja Badania Wypadków Kolejowych (NIB) http://www.mi.gov.pl
Portugal	Instituto da Mobilidade e dos Transportes Terrestres http://www.imtt.pt	Gabinete de Investigação de Segurança e de Acidentes Ferroviários (GISAF) http://www.directorio.moptc.pt/index.asp?detalhe=58&pocao=1
Romania	Autoritatea Feroviara Romana (AFER) Romanian Railway Safety Authority http://www.afer.ro	Autoritatea Feroviara Romana (AFER) Romanian Railway Investigating Body http://www.afer.ro
Sweden	Transportstyrelsen http://www.transportstyrelsen.se	Statens haverikommission http://www.havcom.se
Slovenia	Public Agency of the Republic of Slovenia for Railway Transport http://www.azp.si	Ministry of Transport Railway Accident and Incident Investigation Division http://www.mzp.gov.si
Slovakia	Railway Regulatory Authority (URZD) http://www.urzd.sk	Ministry of Transport Posts and Telecommunication http://www.telecom.gov.sk
United Kingdom	Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) http://www.rail-reg.gov.uk	Rail Accident Investigation Branch http://www.raib.gov.uk
Channel Tunnel	Channel Tunnel Safety Authority ctsa@orr.gsi.gov.uk Secrétariat général au Tunnel sous la Manche (SGTM) tunnelmanche@equipement.gouv.fr	See the relevant authority or body in France or the United Kingdom for the respective part of the Channel Tunnel

Key documents and references

Regulation (EC) No 881/2004 of the European Parliament and Council of 29 April 2004 establishing a European railway agency amended by Regulation (EC) No 1335/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008.

Directive 2004/49/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on safety on the Community's railways and amending Council Directive 95/18/EC on the licensing of railway undertakings and Directive 2001/14/EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of charges for the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification.

amended by

- Directive 2008/57/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008
- Directive 2008/110/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008
- Commission Directive 2009/149/EC of 27 November 2009 as regards Common Safety Indicators and common methods to calculate accident costs.

Regulation (EC) No 91/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council on rail transport statistics amended by

- Commission Regulation (EC) No 1192/2003 of 3 July 2003
- Commission Regulation (EC) No 1304/2007 of 7 November 2007
- Regulation (EC) No 219/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2009

The annual reports of all Member States' NIBs and NSAs submitted to the Agency.

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European Railway Agency 120, Rue Marc Lefrancq BP 20392 59307 Valenciennes Cedex FRANCE Tel. +33 327096500 Fax: +33 327334065 www.era.europa.eu



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Headquarters in Valenciennes

120, Rue Marc Lefrancq 59300 Valenciennes FRANCE

Tel. +33 327096-500

Conference centre in Lille

Espace International 299, Boulevard de Leeds 59777 Lille FRANCE

www.era.europa.eu





